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IN A LEAGUE OF HER OWN: WHY FEMALE STUDENT-ATHLETES
ARE POISED TO WIN BIG IN THE NIL ERA WITH A PROPERLY
CRAFTED FEDERAL LAW
ABSTRACT
Today’s student-athletes have seen perhaps one of the biggest changes
to the collegiate athletics landscape: individual states are now enacting
legislation that allows student-athletes to profit off their name, image and
likeness (“NIL”) in the lucrative age of social media. Gone are the days of the
NCAA’s adamant refusal to permit student-athlete compensation under the rigid
guise of “amateurism.” Although top athletes in highly followed sports like
men’s basketball and football are poised to earn hefty endorsement deals, female
student-athletes who have far fewer opportunities to become professional
athletes are the real winners in the NIL era. In order to properly manage these
benefits and protect student-athletes, a comprehensive federal NIL law that
asserts, inter alia, that student-athletes have the same protections under antitrust
law as any other member of society is necessary. Such legislation correctly
maintains the proper notion of amateurism without exploiting the labor of
collegiate athletes.
This Note examines the different proposed and enacted state and federal
NIL laws and their effect on West Virginia and student-athletes everywhere. It
then analyzes the history of amateurism in NCAA regulations and various
antitrust challenges asserting the anticompetitive effects that stem from such
policies. Finally, it provides recommendations for what a federal NIL law should
look like, advocating for robust protections that place student-athletes at the
center of the discussion. This Note emphasizes the positive effect that a proper
federal NIL law will have upon female student-athletes who historically receive
less recognition and compensation following graduation and in the professional
world in comparison to their male counterparts.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Eighteen-year-old American gymnast Sunisa Lee stood pacing, staring
at the scoreboard as the judges tallied the final scores, anxiously waiting to see
if she would become the next all-around Olympic champion. Cameras flashed all
around her and tears welled in her eyes as she saw her name in first position—
Sunisa Lee is 2021’s greatest gymnast.1 While earning a gold medal is a
miraculous accomplishment for any athlete, it was particularly special for Lee,
who was accustomed to competing with the world-famous Olympic champion
Simone Biles.2 Still in complete and utter shock, Lee expressed that “[t]his is
such a surreal moment. I just feel like I could have never been here ever. It
doesn’t even feel like real life.”3

1

Holly Yan, US Gymnast Suni Lee Wins Olympic All-around After Injuries, Tragedies and a
Horrific Accident, CNN SPORTS (July 29, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/29/sport/gymnastsuni-lee-profile/index.html.
2
Simone Biles, frequently referred to as the greatest gymnast of all time, currently holds 32
Olympic and World Championship medals. Caria Correa, How Many Olympic Medals Does Biles
Have?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/03/sports/olympics/simone-biles-medal-count.html.
3
Yan, supra note 1.
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Lee verbally committed to continue her gymnastics career at Auburn
University when she was just fourteen years old.4 Traditionally, many American
gymnasts of Lee’s caliber would forgo collegiate gymnastics so they could earn
money in the “professional” gymnastics world, deciding that this would be a
more lucrative option than a university athletic scholarship.5 By electing to
accept sponsorship and endorsement money, an athlete is deemed to be a
professional and is thus ineligible to compete in their sport in college.6 The
dichotomy between professional and amateur status is particularly harsh in
gymnastics, where female gymnasts’ athletic abilities typically peak in their
teenage years. 7
Many began to wonder if Lee would have to make the difficult decision
that so many Olympic gymnasts before her had made: Would she honor her
commitment to Auburn, or would she instead choose to “cash in” on her fame?8
Fortunately for Lee and student-athletes everywhere, the dollar signs that divide
an amateur athlete from a professional one are becoming less rigid thanks to new
name, image and likeness (“NIL”) legislation.
Part I of this Note examines the current NIL landscape, including
existing and proposed NIL legislation by West Virginia and other states
throughout the country. It also analyzes the interim NCAA NIL by-law and
legislative developments at the federal level. Part II will answer the question of
why it took so long to make NIL progress by illustrating the history of
“amateurism” in NCAA policy and legal challenges brought by student-athletes
under antitrust law. This part also dissects notable judicial decisions that paved
the way towards the NIL-era. Finally, Part III suggests three components for a
comprehensive, liberally constructed federal NIL law that will place student-

4
Jack West, World Champion Gymnast Signs with the Tigers, THE AUBURN PLAINSMAN (Mar.
1, 2021), https://www.theplainsman.com/article/2021/03/world-champion-gymnast-signs-withthe-tigers.
5
Ella Donald, The Changing World of Simone Biles and US Women’s Gymnastics Team, CNN
(July 27, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/07/22/opinions/usa-gymnastics-olympics-simonebiles-jordan-chiles-donald/index.html (illustrating that 2016 Olympic all-around champion
Simone Biles, after committing to compete collegiately at UCLA years earlier, decided to forgo
her athletic scholarship and turn professional by signing with an agent instead).
6
Associated Press, For Elite Gymnasts, Going Pro is a Complicated Choice, USA TODAY
(July 20, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2016/07/20/for-elite-gymnastsgoing-pro-is-a-complicated-choice/87340808/.
7
One Olympic gymnast, Jordyn Wieber, who opted to become a professional athlete in high
school, struggled with her decision to forego competition in collegiate gymnastics. Id. Jordyn went
on to coach NCAA gymnastics, and one of her colleagues shared Jordyn’s expressed regret: “She
kept asking, ‘Is there a way to give the money back?’” Id.
8
Thomas Baker, New NCAA NIL Rules May Result in More Olympians Staying in School,
FORBES (Aug. 7, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbaker/2021/08/07/new-ncaa-nilrules-may-result-in-more-olympians-staying-in-school/?sh=c2f05744c682.
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athletes (especially female student-athletes) at the center of the discussion and
afford them previously unheard-of financial, social, and educational benefits.
II. BACKGROUND
Graduation marks the end of a student-athlete’s competitive athletic
career for the majority of those that participate.9 National Collegiate Athletic
Association (“NCAA”) statistics reveal a sobering reality: “[f]ewer than 2% of
all collegiate athletes will go on to play professional sports.”10 This can be a hard
pill to swallow for student-athletes who may have dedicated their entire lives to
a sport—especially those who may have chosen their university for the school’s
athletic pedigree more so than its academic programs and fields of study.11 The
post-college landscape can be even more sparse for female athletes, as
professional female athletic leagues are fewer in number and viewership.12 Even
for those hardworking female athletes that do eventually make the pros, the pay
gap between men’s and women’s athletics is staggering:
In 2014, fifty-two National Basketball Association (NBA)
players were each paid more individually than all of the
Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA) players’
salaries combined. That same year, the Professional Golf
Association (PGA) awarded its winner more than five times the
amount awarded to the winner of the Ladies Professional Golf
Association (LGPA) tour. Tennis sensation Serena Williams
earned a smaller prize for winning than her male peer competing
in the same tournament. And the United States Women’s
National Soccer Team (USWNT) received thirty-three million

9
Erik Cliburn, The Equity Debate in College Sports Goes Beyond Financial Compensation,
INSIGHT INTO DIVERSITY (May 17, 2021), https://www.insightintodiversity.com/the-equity-debatein-college-sports-goes-beyond-financial-compensation/.
10
Id.
11
One study observed that student-athletes tend to take easier classes than their non-studentathlete counterparts, a trend that is not unique to just “power conference” schools (meaning, the
schools that routinely attract the country’s top recruits) but also Division III and Ivy League
universities that do not even offer athletic scholarships. The study went on to find that studentathletes do highly value their education but worry that “their teammates would judge them for it,
so they study a little less, or take an easier major.” The authors term this phenomenon “pluralistic
ignorance.” Daniel Oppenheimer, Why Student Athletes Continue to Fail, TIME (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://time.com/3827196/why-student-athletes-fail/.
12
Cliburn, supra note 9 (illustrating that just 0.8% of female basketball players become
professionals, a statistic that is 0.4% lower than their male counterparts).
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dollars less in prize money for winning the World Cup than their
male peers on the German National Team.13
Although many student-athletes view their athletics as their job, the
harsh truth is simply that athletes with stories and accomplishments like Lebron
James and Serena Williams are the outliers, not the norm. Sports psychologists
have examined this reality, even going so far as likening the transition from
college athletics to “normal” life to a “loss of a loved one or other tragic event.”14
Jenny Wilson, a former swimmer at Northwestern University, expressed how
much she missed her athletic career and voiced that there is now “a huge void in
[her] life.”15 For athletes like Wilson, their athletics define and shape their lives.16
Fortunately, today’s young athletes are no longer forced to choose
between continuing athletics at the university level or foregoing collegiate
athletics altogether because of a powerful and long overdue push for fair studentathlete compensation: name, image and likeness (“NIL”) legislation.17 Put
simply, NIL rules permit a student-athlete to be paid for a wide range of
activities, such as autographs and sponsored advertisements on social media.18
While doubtless a decisive step forward, NIL legislation also strikes an equitable
balance: student-athletes must not be paid directly for their athletic performance,
nor are they to be paid directly by the university (exclusive of scholarship and
financial aid).19 As the name suggests, NIL policy allows student-athletes to be
compensated for their name, image and likeness without losing amateur status,
an unprecedented feature in collegiate athletics.20
The timing of recent NIL policies and legislation is great news for
student-athletes who are already fluent in the world of social media.21 Jeremy
Evans, an accomplished entertainment, media, and sports attorney, summarizes
this perfectly: “Social media is indeed a referee that moves the sticks of
13

Nicole Zerunyan, Time’s Up: Addressing Gender-Based Wage Discrimination in
Professional Sports, 38 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 229, 231–32 (2018).
14
Zak Cheney-Rice, Here’s What Happens to the 98% of College Athletes Who Don’t Go Pro,
MIC (Mar. 19, 2014), https://www.mic.com/articles/85789/here-s-what-happens-to-the-98-ofcollege-athletes-who-don-t-go-pro.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Baker, supra note 8.
18
Questions
and
Answers
on
Name,
Image
and
Likeness,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/questions-and-answers-name-image-and-likeness (last visited Sept. 16,
2022).
19
Id. Individual states that have enacted their own NIL laws differ slightly, but most share the
same core characteristics. See infra Part III.A.
20
Timothy Winkler, The End of an Error: Reforming the NCAA Through Legislation, 90
UMKC L. REV. 219, 236 (2021).
21
See Jeremy M. Evans, Student-Athlete Brands in the Age of Name, Image, and Likeness, 13
LANDSLIDE 26, 26 (2020).
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monetization.”22 Social networking sites, such as Instagram, Twitter and TikTok,
allow student-athletes to be more seen than ever—when a student-athlete appears
on television, whether it be in a college football game, during the March Madness
tournament, or a broadcast of a collegiate gymnastics meet, their popularity on
social media is poised to increase.23 With heightened social media presence
comes increased earning potential.24
For example, one estimate found that twin University of Miami
basketball players Hanna and Haley Cavinder, who have approximately 5 million
social media followers, have capitalized on their NILs by booking nearly $1.7
million in sponsorship deals.25 The Cavinder twins are not alone26—there are
countless female student-athletes all around the country that have remarkable
social media presences and the possibility of earning serious money off of their
NIL.27 Given the prevalence of social media and the unlikelihood of becoming a
professional athlete, it is an understatement to say that NIL reform is crucial for
student-athletes everywhere.

22

Id.
Id.
24
More social media engagement via increased followers, “likes”, and “shares” raises the price
of a brand partnerships promoted by the student-athlete on her social media accounts. Id.
25
Brett Knight, Cavinder Twins, Stars on TikTok and Basketball Court, are Nearing $2 Million
in
NIL
Deals,
with
More
Ahead,
FORBES
(July
1,
2022),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brettknight/2022/07/01/haley-hanna-cavinder-twins-ncaanil/?sh=d6ad8ee5a41f.
26
Patrick Hruby, Women’s Worth: How Female NCAA Athletes Will Profit in the New Era of
NIL
Rights,
GLOB.
SPORT
MATTERS
(Mar.
12,
2021),
https://globalsportmatters.com/business/2021/03/12/womens-worth-how-female-ncaa-athleteswill-profit-in-the-new-era-of-nil-rights/ (noting the NIL power of Louisiana State University
gymnast Olivia Dunne who, at the time of the article’s publication, has approximately five million
social media followers).
27
While NIL policies will clearly also benefit male student-athletes, female student-athletes
particularly benefit from the ability to utilize social media for financial gain because, as previously
mentioned, the prospects for female students to go professional and earn significant amounts of
money are narrower than those of their male counterparts. Furthermore, even female studentathletes with smaller follower totals have real potential to earn NIL compensation. Kristi Dosh, A
Letter to Female Student Athletes About NIL, BUS. OF COLL. SPORTS (Jul. 6, 2021),
https://businessofcollegesports.com/name-image-likeness/a-letter-to-female-student-athletesabout-nil/ (noting that the majority of social media deals in 2020 were with “micro-influencers,”
or social media users with under 15,000 followers).
23
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III. THE CURRENT NIL LANDSCAPE - A SAMPLING OF VARIOUS NIL LAWS
AND POLICIES
A. Individual States
California led the NIL charge at the legislative level when it passed its
Fair Pay to Play Act back in September 2019.28 Despite its early passage, the law
did not go into effect until 2021.29 Florida then followed suit and, due to the
delayed effective date of the California law, was the first active NIL law in the
country.30 Following California and Florida, 40 states currently have either
enacted or proposed an NIL law. 31 There are several common characteristics
among existing laws, such as stipulations that state that universities and
conferences may not interfere with student-athletes’ ability to secure NIL deals,32
requirements that students-athletes must disclose their deals to their university,33
and provisions that universities may not reduce scholarship or grant-in-aid based
on a student-athlete’s NIL compensation.34
Today, a clear state-by-state NIL patchwork has formed. Individual
states are rushing to enact some form of NIL legislation to keep up with recent
trends and to prevent being disadvantaged with respect to athlete recruitment.35
After all, why would a top athlete choose to play for a university in a state that
would prevent him from earning money for his own name, image and likeness
when a university in a neighboring state would allow him to do so?36 West

28
CAL. EDUC. CODE. ANN. § 67456 (West 2022). It is noteworthy that the original effective
date was changed from January 1, 2023, to September 1, 2021, likely to keep up with the tide of
new NIL legislation.
29
Id.
30
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.74 (West 2022).
31
This figure is current as of October 20, 2022. See Tracker: Name, Image and Likeness
Legislation
by
State,
BUS.
OF
COLL.
SPORTS
(Sept.
21,
2021),
https://businessofcollegesports.com/tracker-name-image-and-likeness-legislation-bystate/#:~:text=Tracker%3A%20Name%2C%20Image%20and%20Likeness%20Legislation%20b
y%20State,up%20from%201%2F1%2F2023%29%20%2031%20more%20rows%20.
32
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-75-1303(b) (West 2022).
33
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 398.310(2) (West 2022).
34
TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2802(e) (West 2022).
35
E.g., Andrew Quintana, Cashing In: How the NCAA’s NIL Rules Could Impact College
Recruiting, 10 TAMPA BAY (Aug. 24, 2021), https://www.wtsp.com/article/sports/ncaa-nil-rulecollege-recruiting/67-1bf6fbde-ba48-4df5-9999-9166c6fae91c.
36
Id. (illustrating the experience of McKenzie Milton, a former University of Central Florida
quarterback who entered the transfer portal after Florida signed its NIL law and elected to stay in
the state to attend Florida State University: “‘Knowing that [the law] would fall on my last year of
possibly playing college football . . . it definitely played a role in me staying in Florida,’ Milton
said.”).
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Virginia is an example of state that has not yet enacted an NIL law—the
implications of this reality will be discussed below.
B. NCAA NIL By-Law
Recognizing the potential issues and unforeseen consequences that may
arise as a result of each state signing its own NIL law (and some states not
enacting one at all), the NCAA stepped in and promulgated its own NIL policy
that applies to all states that have universities governed by the NCAA, namely
serving colleges and universities in the states that have not enacted an NIL law
at all.37 The NCAA by-law is actually quite scant—the only major rules it
establishes are that student-athletes may not enter a “pay-for-play” agreement
(i.e., we will pay you X amount of dollars if you score a touchdown), and that
student-athletes may obtain a professional services provider, such as an agent or
marketing manager.38
The NCAA asserts that its new by-law is to be applied in an interim
capacity.39 NCAA president Mark Emmert emphasized that federal legislation is
needed to bring uniformity to college athletics:
This is an important day for college athletes since they all are
now able to take advantage of name, image and likeness
opportunities[.] With the variety of state laws adopted across the
country, we will continue to work with Congress to develop a
solution that will provide clarity on the national level. The
current environment—both legal and legislative—prevents us
from providing a more permanent solution and the level of detail
student-athletes deserve.40
Despite the long delay in NCAA action, the position that a federal law is
needed to properly manage NIL rights is well-taken. This Note will address this
issue further and provide substantive recommendations in Part III.

37

Interim
NIL
Policy,
NCAA,
https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/ncaa/NIL/NIL_InterimPolicy.pdf (last visited October 20,
2022); Michelle Brutlag Hosick, NCAA Adopts Interim Name, Image and Likeness Policy, NCAA
(June 30, 2021), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-adopts-interimname-image-and-likeness-policy.
38
Christopher Cody Wilcoxson, Name, Image, and Likeness: Five Months into the NCAA’s
New Frontier, JD SUPRA (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/name-image-andlikeness-five-months-1219411/.
39
Interim NIL Policy, supra note 37.
40
Id.
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C. NIL Developments at the Federal Level
Congress gave ample attention to the new era that is student-athlete
compensation, and several bills have been introduced by Republicans and
Democrats alike—some even backed with bi-partisan sponsorship.41 Cory
Booker (D-NJ), a former Stanford football tight end and co-sponsor of the
College Athlete Bill of Rights, vehemently argues for enhanced NIL rights for
student-athletes:
Modern college athletics is a de facto for-profit industry that is
just too often exploiting men and women—taking advantage of
their genius, of their talent, of their artistry, robbing many of
them of earnings in their peak years, leaving them often injured
with a lifetime worth of costs, sometimes looking back and their
universities are still making profits off of their names.42
In addition to sharing many of the common characteristics of NIL bills,
Booker’s bill is unique in many ways.43 One of the most progressive components
of the College Athlete Bill of Rights is that it would require profit sharing among
high-revenue sports.44 The bill proposes that if a sport’s revenue is greater than
the cost of scholarships, the profits are to be shared equally among the
scholarship players.45 In contrast, Senator Roger Wicker’s (R-MS) proposed bill
is on the more conservative side of the proposed federal legislation and explicitly

41
See, e.g., Student-Athlete Equity Act, H.R.1804, 116th Cong. (2019); College Athlete Bill
of Rights, S. 5062, 116th Cong. (2020); College Athlete Economic Freedom Act; S. 238, 117th
Cong. (2021); Collegiate Athlete and Compensatory Rights Act, S. 5003, 116th Cong. (2020);
Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, S. 4004, 116th Cong. (2020); Amateur Athletes Protection
and Compensation Act of 2021, S. 414, 117th Cong. (2021); Student-Athlete Level Playing Field
Act, H.R. 2841, 117th Cong. (2021).
42
Video: Booker: “Now is the Time for the NCAA to Evolve as an Organization to Truly Put
the Students First and Their Concerns and Their Needs . . . If We Delay Justice for Those Athletes,
Justice
Delayed
is
Justice
Denied,
CORY
BOOKER
(June
9,
2021),
https://www.booker.senate.gov/news/press/video_booker-now-is-the-time-for-the-ncaa-toevolve-as-an-organization-to-truly-put-the-students-first-and-their-concerns-and-their-needs-ifwe-delay-justice-for-those-athletes-justice-delayed-is-justice-denied.
43
For example, the bill would require universities to establish a medical trust fund to cover
out-of-pocket medical expenses related to student-athlete injuries. College Athlete Bill of Rights,
S. 5062, 116th Cong. § 6 (2020).
44
Id. § 5(b).
45
Id. This ambitious proposal could mean men’s football and basketball players would be
entitled to earn $173,000 and $115,600 a year, respectively, and female basketball players could
earn $19,050. Billy Witz, Bill Offers New College Sports Model: Give Athletes a Cut of the Profits,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/sports/ncaafootball/collegeathlete-bill-of-rights.html.
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emphasizes that student-athletes are not employees and institutions may not,
directly or indirectly, provide compensation to NIL-earning athletes.46
Despite some division, many college coaches appear to be on board with
the new NIL era and the push for federal intervention.47 One anonymous survey
found that only two out of 12 coaches shared that they had serious concerns about
the new NIL policies and their effect on collegiate athletics.48 Although the
general sentiment is that compensation for hardworking student-athletes is a
good thing, the more apprehensive coaches are concerned about loopholes and
the potential for exploitation.49 One coach weighed in: “Yes, I am for players
being able to earn extra money, but [I] feel the process has been rushed and there
will be many unintended consequences.”50
There is no federal law on the books yet, and it remains unclear exactly
what provisions a federal NIL law would contain. To be sure, college coaches
and collegiate sports fans everywhere have a right to remain skeptical until a
federal law exists. The best way to ensure student-athlete compensation rights
and university and conference compliance is to enact a law that applies equally
to institutions everywhere. The most sensical medium for achieving this goal is
robust federal legislation.
D. How West Virginia University Student-Athletes are Faring Without a
West Virginia NIL Law
West Virginia does not currently have an enforceable NIL law. The
legislature, however, has introduced a bill that would allow the state’s studentathletes to enjoy all the privileges that states with NIL laws afford to their
student-athletes.51 House Bill 2583 was first introduced in February of 2021 and
has since been referred to the Committees on Education and, subsequently, the
Judiciary.52 In the absence of a West Virginia NIL law, West Virginia University
(“WVU”) has quickly asserted that WVU student-athletes may earn
46

Collegiate Athlete and Compensatory Rights Act, S. 5003, 116th Cong. § 4(c) (2020).
In an anonymous survey of college coaches by CBS Sports, one coach stated: “I believe [NIL
legislation] will actually make things more transparent. I know a lot of schools are jockeying to
figure out how to ‘legally’ pay recruits and their own players.” Matt Norlander, Candid Coaches:
Will Name, Image and Likeness Legislation Increase or Decrease Cheating in College Sports?,
CBS SPORTS (Oct. 4, 2021), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/candid-coacheswill-name-image-and-likeness-legislation-increase-or-decrease-cheating-in-college-sports/.
48
Bill Bender, 2021 Coaches Survey: FBS Coaches Anonymously Weigh in on NIL, Transfer
Portal, Playoff Expansion and More, SPORTING NEWS (Aug. 17, 2021),
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/ncaa-football/news/coaches-survey-fbs-coaches-anonymouslyweigh-in-on-nil-transfer-portal-playoff-expansion-and-more/1eylk6zzw2wiczlmglskf309o.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
See H.B. 2583, Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2021).
52
Id.
47
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compensation for their name, image and likeness in accordance with the NCAA’s
interim NIL policy and University character: “In an effort to prioritize studentathlete well-being, these name, image, and likeness opportunities may occur in a
manner that is consistent with the core values, mission, and principles of West
Virginia University[.]”53
WVU, a Division I school, attracts and regularly recruits talented
athletes to continue their education and athletic careers in Morgantown.54
Although often recognized for its accomplished football team, WVU is also
home to many remarkably successful women’s sports: for example, the women’s
soccer program is currently ranked among the top 30% of NCAA Division I
teams,55 and a recent Associate Press poll ranked the women’s basketball team
22nd among all Division I women’s basketball teams.56 Among these successful
teams are individual student-athletes who boast sizable followings on social
media.57
Despite not having a state NIL law, these talented WVU student-athletes
are not disadvantaged in the NIL era.58 In fact, WVU actively encourages
student-athlete compensation. WVU has partnered with VEEPIO, a company
that will “create, facilitate and oversee NIL sponsorship opportunities.”59 This
partnership will be full service, as it will help student-athletes by brokering
sponsorship deals, monitoring analytics, and even “customiz[ing] a student-

53
Name,
Image
and
Likeness
Policy,
WVU
SPORTS,
https://wvusports.com/sports/2021/7/1/nil-policy.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2022).
54
See
West
Virginia
Mountaineers,
ESPN,
http://www.espn.com/collegesports/football/recruiting/school/_/id/277/class/2022 (last visited Sept. 16, 2022) (providing that
West Virginia University currently has 25 football players committed to joining the team next year,
four of which are 4-star recruits).
55
Women’s Soccer, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.com/rankings/soccer-women/d1/ncaa-womenssoccer-rpi (last visited Sept. 16, 2022).
56
Nick Farrell, WVU Women’s Basketball Ranks No. 22 in Latest AP Poll, GOLD & BLUE
NATION (Nov. 15, 2021), https://www.wboy.com/goldandbluenation/wvuhoops/wvu-womensbasketball-ranks-no-22-in-latest-ap-poll/.
57
See Craig Meyer, A New World: How Female College Athletes Have Capitalized on New
Name, Image and Likeness Rules, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Oct. 16, 2021), https://www.postgazette.com/sports/Pitt/2021/10/16/pitt-panthers-penn-state-nittany-lions-west-virginiamountaineers-ncaa-name-image-likeness-female-sports/stories/202110170076 (providing that
Ana Zortea, a swimmer at WVU, has capitalized on her NIL by working with hair and skin care
brands, and that Rachel Hornug, a WVU gymnast, plans to make NIL deals to engage with her
40,000+ followers).
58
Id.
59
Michael Fragale, Athletics Partners with VEEPIO to Facilitate NIL, WVU SPORTS (July 29,
2021),
https://wvusports.com/news/2021/7/29/baseball-athletics-partners-with-veepio-tofacilitate-nil.aspx. Similarly, WVU alumni have created the Country Roads Trust, a fund designed
to help WVU student-athletes arrange NIL details. The Mission, Country Roads Trust,
https://countryroadstrust.com/about/ (last visited Oct. 21, 2022). Despite serving only WVU
student-athletes, the Country Roads Trust is a separate entity independent of the University. Id.
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athlete’s profile for distribution and secure payment for the student-athlete.”60 It
is clear that even without a state law mandating compliance, WVU plans to fully
capitalize on new NIL policies and provide its students not only with the
opportunity to earn some money but also the ability to properly manage these
new opportunities for success in the future.
E. Looking Ahead: NIL Rights for All
The paradox of the NIL era is that it is both progressive yet also merely
reflective of a policy that should have been in place decades ago. NIL legislation
promotes the common good in many ways and represents the not-sounbelievable concept that student-athletes should be able to make money off of
what has always been theirs: their own name, image and likeness. Although NIL
legislation is a blessing for both female and male student-athletes, female athletes
stand to benefit in an unprecedented way by capitalizing on their own name,
image and likeness in a world where female professional sports leagues and
opportunities are historically less appreciated than their male counterparts.61 In
addition to financially assisting young athletes, NIL laws strike an equitable
balance between amateurism and professional sports by preserving “the fact that
college sports are not pay-for-play.”62
The items in the “pro” column for robust NIL policy seemingly outweigh
those in the “con” column, which inevitably begs the question: what took so
long? An answer to this question requires a look into the history of the rigid
adherence to amateurism in college sports and previous NCAA policy.
IV. THE PRE-NIL LANDSCAPE—THE HISTORY OF AMATEURISM IN
COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
A. NCAA Policy and Amateurism
Because the NCAA considers collegiate athletes “amateurs,” it has
historically prevented them from receiving compensation as student-athletes.63
The bare assertion that these athletes are amateurs, rather than professionals, has
long been the NCAA’s sole support for preventing student-athlete

60

Fragale, supra note 59.
Zerunyan, supra note 13, at 239.
62
Hosick, supra note 37.
63
See Brian L. Porto, Neither Employees nor Indentured Servants: A New Amateurism for a
New Millennium in College Sports, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 301, 301 (2016). Not only has this
label prohibited even modest compensation, but Porto also argues that it has created an
environment wherein participation in athletics is restricted to “athletes whose personal or family
finances permitted them to train and compete without the need to profit from their athletic labors.”
Id. at 303.
61
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compensation.64 This stance was abundantly clear in an interview between
Michael Rosenberg, a writer for Sports Illustrated, and Myles Brand, a former
NCAA president:
Brand: “They can’t be paid.”
Rosenberg: “Why?”
Brand: “Because they’re amateurs.”
Rosenberg: “What makes them amateurs?”
Brand: “Well, they can’t be paid.”
Rosenberg: “Why not?”
Brand: “Because they’re amateurs.”
Rosenberg: “Who decided they are amateurs?”
Brand: “We did.”
Rosenberg: “Why?”
Brand: “Because we don’t pay them.”65
This circular logic rested at the heart of the argument against direct
compensation from the university to the student-athlete in the name of
amateurism in collegiate athletics,66 despite proponents of amateurism failing to
articulate what exactly amateurism meant beyond the bare assertion that “payfor-play” is prohibited.67 The NCAA first defined the term amateur in 1916 as
“one who participates in competitive physical sports only for the pleasure, and
the physical, mental, moral, and social benefits directly derived therefrom.”68

64
Id.
at
301–02
(citing
Amateurism,
NCAA,
https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2014/10/6/amateurism.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2022)).
Amateurism, as the NCAA envisions it, prohibits college athletes from (1)
signing a contract with a professional team in their collegiate sport; (2)
receiving a salary for playing their collegiate sport; (3) receiving prize money
in excess of actual and reasonable expenses; (4) playing in games with
professional athletes; (5) trying out for, practicing with, or competing with a
professional team; (6) receiving “[b]enefits from an agent or prospective
agent”; (7) agreeing to representation by an agent; and (8) “[d]elay[ing] initial
full-time colleg[e] enrollment to participate in organized sports competition.
Id.
65
Erin Cronk, Unlawful Encroachment: Why the NCAA Must Compensate Student-Athletes for
the Use of their Names, Images, and Likenesses, 34 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 135, 139-140 (2013)
(citing Michael Rosenberg, Change is Long Overdue: College Football Players Should be Paid,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED.COM
(Aug.
26,
2010),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/michael_rosenberg/08/26/pay.college/index.html).
66
Id.
67
See In re Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958
F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the Southeastern Conference (SEC) commissioner
himself “[did not] even know what [amateurism] means” and that the “purported pay-for-play
prohibition is riddled with exceptions”).
68
Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict Between NCAA Amateurism and a Student
Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 58 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101, 109 (2014).
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The current NCAA Division I manual provides a nearly identical definition over
100 years later: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport,
and their participation should be motivated primarily by educational and the
physical, mental, and social benefits to be derived.”69
The manual does, however, go a step forward from the 1916 guidelines
by asserting that “student participation in intercollegiate athletics is a vocation,
and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises.”70 Rather than solely focusing on the definition of
amateurism and the alleged motivations for collegiate athletics, this amendment
appears to posit the NCAA as a type of student-athlete guardian rather than an
unforgiving barrier between student-athletes and monetary compensation
beyond scholarship allotment.71 Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this provision
against exploitation does not provide for protection from an athlete’s university,
arguably the most important entity in a young student-athlete’s career. 72 Given
the crucial role that a university’s administration plays in facilitating not only a
student-athlete’s athletic career but also her education, which will doubtless be a
perennial component of her life unlike her competitive athletic endeavors, this
seems like a notable error in NCAA policy.73
Despite any inconsistencies among the exploitation provision, the
NCAA manual makes it clear that universities are only allowed to compensate
student-athletes directly in the form of financial aid that does not exceed the
school’s cost of attendance.74 If a student-athlete is paid for their performance,
she violates the “line of demarcation between college athletics and professional
sports”75 and becomes ineligible to compete in varsity athletic sports.
The NCAA’s amateurism policies remained unaltered despite some
universities raking in millions upon millions of dollars from their athletic
programs.76 For example, in the 2018-2019 fiscal year, the University of Texas’s
69
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, 2020–2021 NCAA DIV. I MANUAL 3 (effective Aug.
1, 2020).
70
Id.
71
See Elsa Kirchner Cole, For the Win: A Story of Academic Fraud and Its Cover-Up to Keep
“Student”-Athletes Eligible in Big-Time College Sports—A Review of Jay M. Smith and Mary
Willingham’s Cheated: The UNC Scandal, the Education of Athletes, and the Future of Big-Time
College Sports, 42 J.C. & U.L. 227 (2016).
72
Id. at 228.
73
Id. (Arguing that the university’s administration and faculty are the people who should be
watching out for student-athletes and “ensuring that they get the education that is the quid pro quo
for their athletics participation”).
74
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N, supra note 69, at 3.
75
Id. at 60.
76
It should be noted that athletic department revenue varies from university to university, and
not all universities bring in millions of dollars through their athletic programs. Nevertheless, 40
Division I schools had over $100 million in gross revenue. Brad Crawford, Ranking College
Sport’s
Highest
Revenue
Producers,
247
SPORTS
(July
17,
2020),
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athletic department brought in approximately $223 million.77 Similarly, NCAA
president Mark Emmert received a $2.5 million salary in the 2019 calendar
year.78 Statistics like these reveal an undeniable truth: universities and NCAA
directors have the potential to earn millions of dollars, whereas student-athletes
who do not make it to a professional league are left with “little or nothing” after
graduation.79
B. Legal Challenges to the NCAA Amateurism Policy via Antitrust Law
The label of “amateurism” stood as a flimsy smokescreen that shielded
the NCAA from successful challenges to the Association’s revenue scheme for
decades.80 But, like most weakly supported defenses, the amateurism argument
was slowly but surely picked apart in the courts. Today, one thing has become
abundantly clear: there is an “inherent contradiction between the NCAA’s
amateurism principle and the billions of dollars profited off student athletes’
names, images, and likenesses.”81
1. Early Challenges and the Adherence to the “Unique” Nature of
College Athletics
Although other athletic associations exist,82 the NCAA is by far the most
dominant given that it has the largest membership and oversees Division I

https://247sports.com/LongFormArticle/College-football-revenue-producers-USA-Today-TexasLonghorns-Ohio-State-Buckeyes-Alabama-Crimson-Tide-149248012/#149248012_2.
77
Id.
78
Steve Berkowitz, NCAA President Mark Emmert Credited with $2.9 Million in Total Pay for
2019
Calendar
Year,
USA
TODAY
(July
19,
2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2021/07/19/ncaa-mark-emmert-total-pay2019/8015855002/.
79
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2168 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).
80
See Orion Riggs, The Facade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 141 (1996).
81
Michael T. Jones, Real Accountability: The NCAA Can No Longer Evade Antitrust Liability
Through Amateurism After O’Bannon v. NCAA, 56 B.C. L. REV. 79, 90–91 (2015).
82
For example, the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) has 250 member
institutions. 2021–22 NAIA Member Institutions, NAT’L ASS’N OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS,
https://www.naia.org/schools/files/2021-22_NAIA_Institutions.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2022).
Similarly, the National Junior College Athletic Association strives to “promote and foster two-year
college athletics.” Some student-athletes opt to attend junior colleges before seeking recruitment
to four-year NCAA university athletic programs. See Mission, NAT’L JUNIOR COLL. ATHLETIC
ASS’N, https://www.njcaa.org/about/mission/Mission_statement (last visited Sept. 16, 2022).
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sports,83 the division in which many professional athletes participate while in
college.84 As an organization, the NCAA rulemaking encompasses a wide range
of issues in college sports, including student-athlete eligibility standards,
disciplinary standards, game schedules, and television advertising contracts.85
Because the NCAA has nearly the sole authority to define amateurism and what
it entails, challenges to its authority assert that it functions as an “economic
cartel” over student-athletes and member schools.86 The NCAA has the authority
to police violations of its by-laws, and member schools are incentivized to
comply with the NCAA’s regulations because of the schools’ economic need to
remain a part of the largest and most recognized collegiate athletic association in
the county.87
Many plaintiffs have tested the reach of antitrust law to college athletics.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the statute that governs federal antitrust law,
provides that “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is
declared to be illegal.”88 The goal of antitrust law is to prevent anticompetitive
practices, unreasonable restraints of trade, and interferences with the free market
system.89 The debate over whether or not to pay collegiate athletes is has
historically been an antitrust issue and one that was only amplified by the
dramatic shift towards profitability in a highly commercialized and lucrative
college sports market.90
Challenges to NCAA governance under antitrust law initially were met
with little success, primarily under the assertion that NCAA rulemaking does not
rise to the level of Sherman Act analysis because such activities do not

83
The NCAA is made up of approximately 1,100 member institutions that award nearly $3.5
billion in athletic scholarships. Overview, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N,
https://www.ncaa.org/sports/2021/2/16/overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2022).
84
Hunter Sharf, 25 Top Colleges That Produce the Most Drafted Pro-Athletes, FORBES (Aug.
2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/huntersharf/2017/08/02/25-top-colleges-that-produce-themost-pro-athletes/?sh=532794a074e9.
85
Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The NCAA and the Rule of Reason, 1796 PENN LAW: LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 1–2 (2017).
86
Matthew J. Mitten, Applying Antitrust Law to NCAA Regulation of “Big Time” College
Athletics: The Need to Shift from Nostalgic 19th and 20th Century Ideals of Amateurism to the
Economic Realities of the 21st Century, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).
87
Id. at 3.
88
Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2022).
89
Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 971 (8th Cir. 1968) (“[T]he purpose of the
Sherman Act is to preserve a system of free competition. This means no unreasonable or undue
restraints are to be imposed on our competitive economic system so as to hinder . . . the free
interplay of vital competition in the marketplace. The public is to be protected from the evils
incident to monopolistic practices.”).
90
See Hennessey v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1146 (5th Cir. 1977).
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sufficiently affect interstate commerce.91 If the NCAA rule being challenged
could be found to be designed to promote amateurism or education, most courts
found that the Sherman Act was inapplicable.92 In an early case, Hennessey v.
NCAA,93 the Fifth Circuit was met with such a challenge and, as an initial
holding, found that although the plaintiff sued only the NCAA, they could
proceed given that the NCAA bylaws could be seen as “the agreement and
concert of action of the various members of the association.”94 Nevertheless,
despite recognizing that the NCAA engages in the business of regulating
intercollegiate athletics, the court was reluctant to find an antitrust violation.95
Just seven years later, the uphill battle against the NCAA became less
steep. In NCAA v. Board of Regents,96 the Supreme Court declined to confer to
the NCAA a blanket exemption from antitrust scrutiny.97 Analyzing the NCAA’s
unique structure,98 the Court conceded that while the NCAA may have legitimate
objectives, it nevertheless is comprised of member organizations that “are in fact
organized to maximize revenues.”99 The Court’s opinion suggested that if the
NCAA activity in question is truly concerned with amateurism or academic
integrity, it does not violate antitrust law.100
Despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Board of Regents declining to
award blanket antitrust protections to the NCAA, subsequent antitrust challenges
were met with mixed success: most NCAA activity was found to be characterized
as noncommercial, to not have anticompetitive effects, or assumed to be
procompetitive by being the least restrictive means of furthering the goals of
amateurism.101 The NCAA’s long-enjoyed protection concerning amateurism
was formulated due to the “nature” of college athletics, as succinctly summarized
by the Supreme Court:

91

See Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975).
Mitten, supra note 86.
93
564 F.2d at 1136.
94
Id. at 1148.
95
Id. at 1154.
96
Nat’l. Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
97
Id. at 100–01.
98
The court notes that advertisers will pay a premium price to reach college football audiences,
and that there is no substitute for these unique broadcasting rights. Id. at 111, 115.
99
Id. at 100 n.22.
100
Id. at 101–02.
101
See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding
that the Sherman Act’s restraint of trade provision did not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of
eligibility rules); Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460, 487 (D.N.J. 1998)
(holding that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA’s promulgation of eligibility
requirements).
92
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[The] NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football—
college football. The identification of this “product” with an
academic tradition differentiates college football from and
makes it more popular than professional sports to which it might
otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor league
baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the
“product,” athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend
class, and the like. And the integrity of the ‘product’ cannot be
preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted
such restrictions unilaterally [restrictions on eligibility rules], its
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be
destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college
football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a
product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable.
In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice—not
only the choices available to sports fans but also those available
to athletes—and hence can be viewed as procompetitive.102
As a result, challenges to NCAA rulemaking were still met with
significant scrutiny. Nevertheless, resilient plaintiffs continued to bring antitrust
actions against the NCAA. Over time, these challenges became more and more
successful. One of the first major successful challenges came out of the Northern
District of California.
2. O’Bannon v. National College Athletic Ass’n
In O’Bannon v. NCAA,103 former collegiate athletes again challenged the
interaction between amateurism rules and antitrust law.104 Ed O’Bannon, a
former UCLA basketball player, served as the lead plaintiff in a class action
lawsuit against the NCAA for the use of the student-athletes’ likeness in, among
other things, the video game NCAA Basketball 09.105 Asserting violations of the
Sherman Act, O’Bannon argued that, upon graduation, student-athletes should
be compensated for the NCAA’s profitable use of their NIL.106 At the district
court level, student-athletes saw a major victory: the court found that the NCAA
violated federal antitrust law by permitting member schools to earn money from

102

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02
(1984) (emphasis added).
103
7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.
2015).
104
Id. at 963.
105
Leslie E. Wong, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes on the NCAA for
Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1069, 1098–
99 (2010).
106
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 962–63.
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the sale of licenses to use student-athletes’ names, images and likenesses in
products such as videogames and live telecasts without sharing profits with the
interested student-athletes.107
Because the Sherman Act is concerned with unreasonable restraints of
trade, the O’Bannon court utilized the rule of reason analysis.108 This analysis
requires a burden-shifting framework wherein the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of showing that the restraint produces significant anticompetitive
effects.109 If the plaintiff satisfies this burden, the defendant must then show that
the restraint instead has procompetitive effects.110 As mentioned above, the
NCAA has historically argued successfully that the nature of college sports and
the NCAA’s role in maintaining them make its actions procompetitive.111
Finally, it is then on the plaintiff to show that “any legitimate objectives can be
achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”112
Using the above analysis, the Northern District of California enjoined
the NCAA from enforcing any rules that would prohibit student-athletes like
O’Bannon from having the opportunity to earn a limited share of the revenue
generated from the use of their NILs.113 The court noted that “[b]ecause FBS
Football and Division I basketball schools are the only suppliers in the relevant
market, they have the power, when acting in concert through the NCAA and its
conferences, to fix the price of their product.”114 The court was not persuaded by
the NCAA’s argument that demand for the NCAA’s product (college athletics)
would decrease if student-athletes were permitted to be compensated a limited

107

Id. at 1007 (“Specifically, the association’s rules prohibiting student-athletes from receiving
any compensation for the use of their names, images, and likenesses restrains price competition
among FBS football and Division I basketball schools as suppliers of the unique combination of
educational and athletic opportunities that elite football and basketball recruits seek.”).
108
Id. at 985 (first citing California ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th
Cir. 2011); and then citing Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006)).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)
(“In order to preserve the character and quality of the ‘product,’ athletes must not be paid, must be
required to attend class, and the like. And the integrity of the ‘product’ cannot be preserved except
by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a
competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in
enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed
which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer
choice—not only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes—and
hence can be viewed as procompetitive.”).
112
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 985.
113
Id. at 1007–08.
114
Id. at 988.
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amount115 for the use of their name, image and likeness.116 The O’Bannon court
directly acknowledged a key issue in the student-athlete compensation debate
that is of relatively recent vintage and has often been dismissed in other cases:
collegiate sports, namely football and basketball, are billion-dollar industries.117
Despite being a historic decision, the victory was short-lived.118
Although the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules were not exempt from antitrust scrutiny, it vacated the lower
court’s holding concerning payment for student NILs by asserting that “the
district court ignored that not paying student-athletes is precisely what makes
them amateurs.”119 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred in
deciding that allowing NIL compensation is a viable alternative under the rule of
reason analysis.120 In so deciding, the court discussed the slippery slope that may
result from the district court’s ruling:
The difference between offering student-athletes educationrelated compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to
education expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that
line is crossed, we see no basis for returning to a rule of
amateurism and no defined stopping point; we have little doubt
that plaintiffs will continue to challenge the arbitrary limit
imposed by the district court until they have captured the full
value of their NIL. At that point the NCAA will have
surrendered its amateurism principles entirely and transitioned
from its “particular brand of football” to minor league status.121
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in O’Bannon, despite recognizing that the
NCAA’s activities are subject to scrutinized attention under antitrust law,
ultimately adhered to the importance of amateurism in college sports.122

115

The opinion did suggest that large amounts of compensation may be different: the NCAA
provided testimony from a survey research expert who opined that “the public’s attitudes toward
student athlete compensation depend heavily on the level of compensation that student-athletes
would receive.” Id. at 1000–01.
116
Id. at 976.
117
Michael Steele, O’Bannon v. NCAA: The Beginning of the End of the Amateurism
Justification for the NCAA in Antitrust Litigation, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 511, 512–13 (2015).
118
See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
119
Id. at 1076.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1078–79.
122
Id. (The court noted that the Supreme Court asserts that “we must afford the NCAA ‘ample
latitude’ to superintend college athletics . . . we think it is clear the district court erred in concluding
that small payments in deferred compensation are a substantially less restrictive alternative
restraint.”).
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O’Bannon appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court, but
certiorari was denied.123
3. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston
Many legal commentators credit NCAA v. Alston124 as a critical turning
point in the student-athlete compensation debate.125 The unanimous opinion,
authored by Justice Gorsuch, will be long remembered (and likely litigated) for
“cut[ting] against a century-old ‘no-pay for play’ college sports regime, but []
with a scalpel rather than a meat cleaver.”126 This perspective is supported by the
fact that although the Court ruled only on caps on academic benefits, its dicta
and searing concurring opinion by Justice Kavanaugh cast serious doubt on
NCAA governance and rulemaking as a whole.127
i.

District and Circuit Court Findings

Although some states had already begun introducing and passing NIL
legislation, NCAA v. Alston rewrote the landscape of student-athlete
compensation.128 In Alston,129 current and former student-athletes sued the
NCAA, alleging violations of antitrust law as a result of the NCAA’s policy of
placing limits on the compensation that student-athletes could receive for their
participation in collegiate sports.130
The district court findings were twofold: (1) the court left undisturbed
NCAA rules related to limits on athletic scholarships; and (2) the court struck
down the NCAA rules that limit education-related benefits that schools may offer

123

O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 277 (2016).
141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
125
Gregory Marino, NCAA v. Alston: The Beginning of the End or the End of the Beginning?,
JD SUPRA (Aug. 5, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ncaa-v-alston-the-beginning-ofthe-end-9351737/.
126
Id.
127
Kwanghyuk David Yoo, SCOTUS Analysis: NCAA v. Alston, EMORY L. NEWS CTR. (Aug. 2,
2021), http://law.emory.edu/news-and-events/releases/2021/08/scotus-yoo-ncaa-v-alston.html.
128
Derrick L. Maultsby Jr., Stephanie Weber, & Anna Williams, Supreme Court Sides with
Student Athletes . . . But What Does That Mean?, JACKSON KELLY: THE LEGAL BRIEF (June 23,
2021),
https://www.jacksonkelly.com/the-legal-brief-blog/supreme-court-sides-with-studentathletesbut-what-does-that-mean.
129
The lead plaintiff in Alston was Shawne Alston, a former WVU running back. Chris
Bumbaca, Who is Shawne Alston? Meet ex-West Virginia RB, Plaintiff in Landmark NCAA
Supreme
Court
Decision,
USA
Today
(Jun.
21,
2021,
7:43
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2021/06/21/shawne-alston-ncaa-supremecourt/7771854002/.
130
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2147 (2021).
124
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student-athletes.131 Examples of education-related benefits include payments or
scholarships for graduate or vocational school, academic tutoring, and postNCAA eligibility internships.132 Finding that these education-related benefits
could not be “confused with a professional athlete’s salary,” the district court
accordingly entered an injunction preventing the NCAA from placing a cap on
the value of education-related benefits provided by individual universities.133 The
court also asserted that the NCAA has a “near complete dominance of, and
exercise[s] monopoly power in, the relevant market”134 because there are no
“viable substitutes” for elite athletes.135 If a talented, young athlete wishes to
continue their athletic career at the highest level, it is essentially NCAA or
bust.136 Upon the district court’s final ruling, both parties appealed137 to the Ninth
Circuit where the ruling was affirmed.138
ii.

Supreme Court Opinion

Certiorari was then granted by the Supreme Court to once again attempt
to strike a balance between antitrust law and the NCAA’s amateurism policies.
The Court put it bluntly: “In essence, [the NCAA] seeks immunity from the
normal operation of the antitrust laws and argues, in any event, that the district
court should have approved all of its existing restraints. We took this case to
consider those objections.”139 Thus, the only issue raised on appeal was the
injunction granted by the lower courts concerning the NCAA’s rules on
education-related benefits, and the court analyzed the issue under a rule of reason
analysis just as the Ninth Circuit did in O’Bannon.140 Affirming the lower courts’
injunction, the Supreme Court echoed the district court’s sentiment that the

131

Id.
Id. at 2153.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 2151.
135
Id. at 2152.
136
Simply put, as the sole supervisor of collegiate athletics, the NCAA has the “power to
restrain student-athlete compensation in any way and at any time they wish, without any
meaningful risk of diminishing their market dominance.” Id.
137
The plaintiffs did not renew their across-the-board challenge to NCAA rulemaking and thus
the Supreme Court did not consider it on appeal. The only rules at issue, as discussed later in this
Note, were those restricting education-related benefits, the subject of the district court’s injunction.
Id. at 2144.
138
In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d
1239, 1266 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. granted sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141
S. Ct. 1231 (2020), and cert. granted sub nom. Am. Athletic Conf. v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 972 (2020),
and aff’d sub nom. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
139
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2147 (2021).
140
Id. at 2151.
132
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NCAA uses its lucrative monopsony141 to artificially cap education-related
benefits.142 The Supreme Court analogized it as such:
The NCAA accepts that its members collectively enjoy
monopsony power in the market for student-athlete services,
such that its restraints can (and in fact do) harm competition.
Unlike customers who would look elsewhere when a small van
company raises its prices above market levels, the district court
found (and the NCAA does not contest here) that studentathletes have nowhere else to sell their labor.143
The Court then went on to conclude that the district court’s judgment
was proper as it did not demand that the NCAA show that its rules were the “least
restrictive means of preserving consumer demand.”144 Rather, its finding that the
restraints in question were “patently and inexplicably stricter than is necessary”
is enough to violate antitrust law.145 The NCAA’s procompetitive goals and
adherence to amateurism were not sufficient reasons to justify the NCAA
policies that restrict education-related benefits for student-athletes.146
Perhaps one of the most striking parts of the decision was Justice
Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion, as it strongly suggested that Alston likely did
not mark the end of litigation concerning the NCAA and its rulemaking.147 While
joining the majority’s opinion in full, Kavanaugh urged that the NCAA’s
compensation rules that were not challenged in Alston (thus, those that are not
about education-related benefits) “also raise serious questions under antitrust
laws.”148 Kavanaugh chiefly asserted the paradox of the NCAA’s circular logic:
the NCAA fully recognizes that it dominates the college sports market through
its rulemaking concerning compensation, thus unilaterally controlling it, but the
141

Monopsony is defined as “a market situation in which one buyer controls the market.”
Monopsony, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “Monopsony is often thought of as the
flip side of monopoly . . . a monopsonist is a buyer with no rivals.” Id. (quoting LAWRENCE A.
SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 137–38
(2000)).
142
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2152.
143
Id. at 2156.
144
Id. at 2161.
145
Id. at 2162.
146
The Court nevertheless emphasized that the injunction entered by the district court is not
limitless, as it would still allow the NCAA to “forbid in-kind benefits unrelated to a student’s actual
education[.]” Id. at 2165. In response to concerns that universities would test the limits of the
decree by, for example, purchasing luxury cars for student-athletes to use to get to class, the court
stated that nothing stops the NCAA from “enforcing a ‘no Lamborghini’ rule.” Id.
147
Id. at 2166–67 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I add this concurring opinion to underscore
that the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules [i.e., those not about education-related benefits]
also raise serious questions under the antitrust laws.”).
148
Id. at 2166–67.
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NCAA also asserts that this is a sound practice because “the defining feature of
college sports” is that the hardworking student-athletes play for free (exclusive
of athletic scholarships).149 Not only is this logic unpersuasive, it is also unheard
of in any other industry. Kavanaugh draws a compelling parallel:
All of the restaurants in a region cannot come together to cut
cooks’ wages on the theory that “customers prefer” to eat food
from low-paid cooks. Law firms cannot conspire to cabin
lawyers’ salaries in the name of providing legal services out of
a “love of the law.” Hospitals cannot agree to cap nurses’
income in order to create a “purer” form of helping the sick.
News organizations cannot join forces to curtail pay to reporters
to preserve a “tradition” of public-minded journalism. Movie
studios cannot collude to slash benefits to camera crews to
kindle a “spirit of amateurism” in Hollywood.150
Kavanaugh’s passionate concurring opinion explicitly states one truth
that has been brewing through the decades of antitrust litigation concerning
university athletics: “The NCAA is not above the law.”151
V. DRAFTING A FEDERAL NIL LAW
As is now abundantly clear, the inescapable reality of college sports prior
to the NIL era was that despite some sports being multi-million dollar industries,
seemingly everyone but the student-athletes got paid.152 Student-athletes were
accustomed to saying no, whether it be to an offer to sponsor a product on
Instagram or to accept something as meager as a free water bottle after winning
a recreational athletic tournament.153 What is even more shocking is that the
NCAA has gone after student-athletes who have received trivial amounts of
money accidentally. In one extreme case, a University of Massachusetts tennis
player saw three seasons’ worth of her wins wiped out when she was mistakenly
given a $126 stipend intended for on-campus students after she had moved to

149

Id. at 2167.
Id.
151
Id. at 2169.
152
Id. at 2168 (“The bottom line is that the NCAA and its member colleges are suppressing the
pay of student athletes who collectively generate billions of dollars in revenue for colleges every
year. Those enormous sums of money flow to seemingly everyone except the student-athletes.
College presidents, athletic directors, coaches, conference commissioners, and NCAA executives
take in six- and seven-figure salaries. Colleges build lavish new facilities. But the student-athletes
who generate the revenues, many of whom are African American and from lower-income
backgrounds, end up with little or nothing.”).
153
Hruby, supra note 26 (illustrating the experience of Hayley Hodson, a former Stanford
University volleyball player, who turned down sponsorship deals with clothing brands because of
the NCAA’s rules on amateurism).
150
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off-campus housing.154 Stories like these are appalling, but thankfully change in
the collegiate sports world has finally come. Now, it must be managed properly.
Despite its unreasonable adherence to amateurism in order to reap
exemptions from the standard application of antitrust law, the NCAA now asserts
that a federal NIL law is necessary:
A federal, nationwide solution for name, image and likeness is
necessary and would provide student-athletes across the county
a fair, uniform collegiate experience and help ensure that
opportunities provided to hundreds of thousands of studentathletes participating in nonrevenue sports continue to be
supported. The Association looks forward to working with
Congress to enact legislation that ensures a federal solution to
NIL legislation, provides narrow safe harbor protections against
ongoing litigation and reaffirms the nonemployment status of
student-athletes. This approach will provide for a uniform name,
image and likeness approach that will result in fair, national
competition for all student-athletes and protect and ensure
opportunities for future student-athletes.155
Although unquestionably a step forward, it must not be ignored that it
took so long to finally get here. The NCAA defends its delayed timetable by
asserting that pushing the NIL issue to the backburner allowed it to “improve
academic support, provide the cost of attendance, guarantee scholarships and
strengthen health and safety.”156 This is not a justification that should be taken
seriously; NIL has long been an important issue to student-athletes, and it should
have been seasonably addressed.157 Rather, the NCAA only began considering

154

Former UMass Tennis Player Brittany Collens Takes on NCAA Over Harsh Penalty, CBS
BOS. (Jan. 5, 2021, 5:55 PM), https://boston.cbslocal.com/2021/01/05/ncaa-umass-womenstennis-team-violatons-sanctions-petition-brittany-collens/.
155
Questions and Answers on Name, Image and Likeness, NCAA (Jan. 2021),
https://www.ncaa.org/questions-and-answers-name-image-and-likeness.
156
Id.
157
Mark Few, the head coach of the men’s basketball team at Gonzaga University, succinctly
described the need for a federal NIL law: “I’m embarrassed that we’re here having to deal with
[NIL legislation] right now . . . These changes are long, long overdue. All athletes deserve to use
their own name, image and likeness in commercial endorsements and on social media. And I’m
very much in favor of them profiting as much as they possibly can from this . . . We can’t run
competitive, fair championships if every state has a different rule.” Rebecca Shabad & Kyle
Stewart, Senators Agree on Need for a National Standard for College Athlete Compensation, NBC
NEWS (June 9, 2021, 2:32 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senators-agree-neednational-standard-college-athlete-compensation-n1270208.
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making serious changes once individual states began rolling out progressive NIL
laws.158
Despite the delay, the NCAA’s new NIL stance is certainly a good one.
A federal NIL law will promote uniformity and take a significant amount of
power out of the NCAA’s hands. The history of NCAA litigation demonstrates
that the NCAA should not be permitted to faithfully execute and oversee the NIL
era; the power should be vested in student-athletes stemming from a federal
source. Additionally, the federal government is more equipped to thoroughly
legislate on the issue and address unforeseen problems that may arise. A stateby-state patchwork could negatively impact recruiting and complicate the
already uncharted territory of endorsement deals for student-athletes, possibly
paving the way for the exploitation of naïve, teenage athletes.159
With all of this in mind, in order to promote the best interests of studentathletes, a federal NIL law must be enacted that (1) treats student-athletes as any
other member of society under antitrust law; (2) mandates that universities create
a financial literacy and tax workshop for student-athletes; and (3) allows states
to create broader protections that are uniquely tailored to their state. A federal
NIL law with these components will be especially beneficial for female athletes
who are historically disadvantaged in the professional sports market.160
A. Student-Athletes Must Have the Same Economic Freedom as Any Other
Member of Society
First and foremost, a federal NIL law must address the antitrust concerns
that have long been the subject of NCAA litigation. The NCAA’s decades-long
insistence upon amateurism in college athletics has shielded it from Sherman Act
scrutiny, creating a rulemaking framework that is virtually unheard of in any
other industry in the United States.161 The NCAA artificially fixes the price of
student-athletes’ labor by setting caps on education and other related benefits
because without NCAA restrictions, an elite student-athlete could surely sell her

158
See Joseph Salvador, NCAA Approves Interim NIL Policy, Change Will Take Effect
Thursday, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 30, 2021), https://www.si.com/college/2021/06/30/nilinterim-policy-approved-starting-thursday (showing the date that the NCAA policy went into
effect). NCAA policies allowing all its member universities’ student-athletes to earn NIL
compensation went into effect on July 1, 2021, the same day Florida’s NIL law went into effect
and almost two years after California passed its NIL law.
159
Matt Savare & Bryan Sterba, What’s in a Name (Image or Likeness)? Quite a Bit for Star
College Athletes, JD SUPRA (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/what-s-in-aname-image-or-likeness-3524746/ (“This complex, patchwork of disparate state laws and NCAA
policy does not lend itself to efficient deal making between brands, agencies, and athletes. Athletes
will understandably be reticent to jeopardize their eligibility by running afoul of this morass.”).
160
See Zerunyan, supra note 13.
161
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2167 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J.,
concurring).

(CORRECTED) WILLIAMS TO PUBLISHER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE )

2022]

IN A LEAGUE OF HER OWN

11/7/22 4:25 PM

397

labor at a much higher price than the cost of her university tuition.162 Studentathletes got the message that they cannot be paid because society as a whole
prefers to consume college athletics that showcase unpaid players.163 Thankfully,
Alston marked the end of some of these restrictions, but Kavanaugh’s
concurrence really gets to the core of the issue and sets the tone for the standard
moving forward: student-athletes are human beings who deserve to have the
same protections and guarantees as any other working person.
One of the many reasons the NCAA’s amateurism argument fails with
respect to NIL rights is that even if a student-athlete is compensated for their
NIL, they are still amateur athletes in the sense that they are not being paid by
their universities.164 As the NCAA interim policy makes clear, student-athletes
are prohibited from accepting money as an inducement to attend a particular
university and from being paid for their athletic performance.165 Critics of the
NIL era must understand that permitting NIL compensation does not mean that
the NCAA is parting with the notion of amateurism.166 On the contrary, studentathletes will still be motivated by the “physical, mental, and social benefits to be
derived,”167 as the NCAA manual requires because the odds of becoming a
professional athlete are incredibly slim—especially for female athletes.168
Moreover, even if a student-athlete hopes to become a professional
athlete, who is to say that the student is not also motivated by her love of the
game and the structure that collegiate athletics brings? One can imagine a
scenario in which a female student-athlete, who has played a sport ever since she
was a young child, opts to forgo joining her university’s team to instead get a job
to help pay for college. Now with robust NIL rights, she can play the sport she
loves while earning compensation by posting a couple of endorsement posts on
Instagram on the side. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit envisioned such a result: “[I]f
anything, loosening or abandoning the compensation rules might be the best way
to ‘widen’ recruits’ range of choices; athletes might well be more likely to attend

162

Id. at 2168.
Id. at 2167–68 (illustrating that this logic is circular and bizarre: “Or to put it in more
doctrinal terms, a monopsony cannot launder its price-fixing of labor by calling it product
definition.”).
164
Jayma Meyer & Andrew Zimbalist, A Win Win: College Athletes Get Paid for Their Names,
Images, and Likenesses and Colleges Maintain the Primacy of Academics, 11 HARV. J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 247, 302–03 (2020) (“The only sensible definition of amateurism for a college athlete
would require that athletes not be paid by member institutions a cash income for playing their
sport.”).
165
Savare & Sterba, supra note 159 (“The NCAA’s interim policy prohibits athletes from
accepting compensation in connection with the commercialization of their persona.”).
166
Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 164, at 257.
167
2020–21 NCAA Division I Manual, Art. 2.9, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (2020),
https://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D121.pdf.
168
Cliburn, supra note 9.
163
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college, and stay there longer, if they knew that they were earning some amount
of NIL income while they were in school.”169
It cannot be said with confidence that allowing NIL compensation will
harm the “nature” of college athletics: For the average student-athlete, the NIL
era means that any extra money earned is just an added bonus: “From a licensing
standpoint, the annual NIL value per student-athlete could range from $1,000–
$10,000, whereas professional athletes garner between $50,000–$400,000.”170
Just because student-athletes are poised to earn some money does not mean that
they can immediately be likened to professional athletes.171
Beyond the most basic recognition that student-athletes should be seen
as human beings rather than sources of cheap labor, a federal NIL law must
prohibit undue restrictions on how an athlete may capitalize on her NIL. The
United States’ free market system has for centuries allowed people to capitalize
on their own NILs.172 One quick scroll through any social media site will reveal
sponsored posts advertising a product, whether the person in the advertisement
is a world-famous celebrity or perhaps an acquaintance with a significant niche
following. The free market neither restricts these endorsements nor requires the
endorsee to divulge the details of the deal.173 The historical nature of the NCAA
and how it previously governed its member schools and conferences with its
amateurism principles should make no contribution to the analysis.174
Currently, some states’ NIL laws restrict how student-athletes can cash
in on their NIL. For example, Texas’s enacted law mandates that a studentathlete “shall, before entering into the contract, disclose to the institution . . . any

169

O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1073 (9th Cir. 2015).
AJ Maestas & Jason Belzer, How Much is NIL Worth to Student Athletes?, ATHLETIC DIR.
U, https://athleticdirectoru.com/articles/how-much-is-nil-really-worth-to-student-athletes/ (last
visited Oct. 26, 2022). Note that this is not to say that elite athletes in the nation’s most followed
sports, such as men’s Division I football or basketball, will not earn unprecedented amounts of
money; one estimate found that based on former LSU quarterback Joe Burrow’s number of
Instagram followers, Burrow could have earned around $700,000 by capitalizing on his NIL. Id.
171
For the sake of argument, even if this compensation would allow student-athletes to be
likened to professional athletes, it likely would not be as detrimental as many opponents suggest.
For example, multi-million-dollar professional athlete salaries do not deter viewership and
consumption of those athletic leagues. Steele, supra note 117, at 538–39.
172
Ronald S. Katz, NCAA’s Proposed NIL Regulations Are an Antitrust Violation Waiting to
Happen, INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. & SOC. JUST., https://iipsj.org/blog-post-on-nil-and-antitrust/ (last
visited Sept. 4, 2022).
173
Id. (“How much someone is being paid for a name, image or likeness is clearly competitively
sensitive information.”).
174
At the risk of belaboring the point, Kavanaugh’s concurrence emphasizes that the importance
of tradition within college athletics cannot alone be used as a means to justify adherence to
amateurism principles at the expense of student-athlete compensation. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2166–69 (2021). Any bare adherence to traditional notions of
college athletics as it relates to the policing of student-athlete endorsement deals would be
counterproductive.
170
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proposed contract the student athlete may sign for use of the student athlete’s
name, image, or likeness.”175 Not only does this create an overbearing standard
for the average college athlete,176 but it erases the privacy that is typically
enjoyed by non-student-athletes who enter NIL deals.177
Another benefit of the free market system is that a person seeking to
capitalize on their NIL may contract with whomever they please.178 Some state
NIL laws would outright prohibit certain NIL deals: “Except with the prior
written consent of the postsecondary education institution, a student athlete may
not enter into a contract . . . if the institution determines that a term of the contract
conflicts with a term of a contract held by the student athlete’s postsecondary
education institution.”179 Provisions like these pave the way for inevitable
conflicts of interest. For example, a university that partners with Nike to furnish
the school’s athletic uniforms may take issue with a student-athlete who seeks to
partner with Adidas.180
Some states even take their NIL laws a step further by prohibiting certain
endorsements that may be considered immoral, banning endorsements for things
like sports betting, tobacco or alcohol, and adult entertainment.181 Mississippi’s
law contains a catch-all provision that forbids NIL deals with products that are
“reasonably considered to be inconsistent with the [university’s] values or
mission,” including deals that would “bring about public disrepute,
embarrassment, scandal, ridicule or otherwise negatively impacting the
reputation or the moral or ethical standards of” the university.182
Requirements like these serve to place inordinate burdens on a studentathlete’s freedom to enter NIL contracts.183 They also have the potential to open
the door to regulate the conduct of female student-athletes by the imposition of
implicit biases upon what is a proper endorsement and what is not. Female

175

S.B. 1385 § 251.9426(g)(1), 87th Leg. (Tex. 2021).
Requiring that the student-athlete disclose any proposed contract that the student-athlete may
sign is far too overreaching and simply unnecessarily broad, especially for a student-athlete who
may have multiple potential endorsement opportunities.
177
Paul A. Schwabe Jr., The Modern Pay for Play Model: Laws That Protect Student-Athletes’
Fundamental Right to Commercialize Their Names, Images, and Likenesses, 15 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 289, 304–05. (“The freedom to contract is a fundamental right that requires
additional legal protections, especially when limitations are sought to be imposed based on status
(i.e., as a student-athlete) rather than capacity or subject matter of the contract.”).
178
Katz, supra note 172.
179
H.B. 404 § 2(f), Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2021).
180
Matt Suchecki, Institutional Conflicts: What Are They and How Can Institutions Prepare for
the Incoming NIL Changes?, SPRY, https://spry.so/insights/institutional-conflicts-what-are-theyand-how-can-institutions-prepare-for-the-incoming-nil-changes/ (last visited Sept. 4, 2022).
181
See S.B. 2313 § 4(14), 136th Sess. (Miss. 2021).
182
Id.
183
Schwabe, supra note 177.
176
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student-athletes have had to overcome numerous obstacles in the world of
collegiate athletics—Title IX legislation in the past few decades perhaps
illustrates the clearest example.184 Female athletes may also be more vulnerable
to stereotypes in the sponsorship market, making it even more difficult to secure
endorsement deals in comparison to their male counterparts.185 Andrea Paloian
notes that well-known female athletes are expected to not only be successful, but
also to maintain traditional notions of femininity.186 One can imagine a situation
wherein a female student-athlete partners with a brand or product that does not
fit within the traditional mold of womanhood, conjuring controversy within her
university. Knowing the obstacles that female athletes have historically had to
face, vesting unchecked authority into the university to decide what is or is not
consistent with university values could present unique challenges that male
student-athletes may never have to face.
Restrictions like those mentioned above are also remarkably broad; who
is to decide what is inconsistent with a university’s values? What is the standard
for deciding when an endorsement deal would bring “ridicule” to a university?
The obvious answer to these questions is that the university would have the sole
authority to determine which products or services are ripe for NIL compensation
and which ones are not, again moving valid student-athlete concerns about
dictating their own future to the back burner.
There are a couple of potential solutions to this problem that avoid
vesting sole authority in the university. The first is a suggestion found in Senator
Booker’s proposed federal bill187: a state may prohibit a student-athlete
endorsement deal for a particular product, service, or industry if the state itself
also prohibits institutions of higher education from entering into such
agreements.188 While this may not be the optimum solution, it prevents
universities from creating their own arbitrary endorsement rules and creates
uniformity among all institutions in a given state.
A second solution would be the creation of an open forum wherein
university officials and student-athlete individuals, representatives, or teams may
discuss their concerns or ideas for future endorsement deals. Such a solution

184

See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 179–81 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that Brown
University was not in compliance with the requirements of Title IX and asserting that even if there
appears to be a lack of female interest in joining university athletic teams, it cannot be ignored that
these differences may be a result of women historically being discouraged from athletic
participation).
185
Andrea Paloian, The Female/Athlete Paradox: Managing Traditional Views of Masculinity
and Femininity, APPLIED PSYCH. OPUS, https://wp.nyu.edu/steinhardt-appsych_opus/thefemaleathlete-paradox-managing-traditional-views-of-masculinity-and-femininity/ (last visited
Sept. 4, 2022).
186
Id.
187
See College Athletes Bill of Rights, S. 5062, 116th Cong. § 3 (2020).
188
Id. §3(a)(3)(A).
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allows the student-athlete to have more control over their own endorsement deals
while still allowing the university to have a say about what they believe is or is
not consistent with their values. This may be the most equitable and democratic
solution, and it helps abate arguments that the paternalistic power over studentathletes has merely shifted from the NCAA to the university.
In summation, a federal NIL law must prevent these arbitrary
requirements and address and dismiss any lingering antitrust concerns by
asserting that student-athletes are nonetheless people who deserve all economic
freedom afforded to every other person in the country. Failing to do so is
reverting to pre-NIL policies that shielded the NCAA and its member universities
from antitrust scrutiny in the name of amateurism.
B. Establishing a Requirement for Tax Education as Part of a Financial
Literacy Workshop
It is abundantly clear that recent NIL policy is a financial game-changer
for student-athletes. Today’s student-athletes will see money deposited into their
bank account that they previously would never be allowed to accept. As a result,
student-athletes may inadvertently overlook their tax obligations.189
Senator Richard Burr (R-NC) has introduced190 the NIL Scholarship Tax
Act,191 which would give student-athletes two choices: Student-athletes can
either receive a tax-free scholarship, or they can instead opt to receive outside
compensation and pay income taxes on their scholarship award.192 The NIL
Scholarship Tax Act has been met with criticism193 and should be rejected
because it again harkens back to an attempt to maintain the outdated “nature of
college sports” model. Indeed, Senator Burr has said as much himself: “It’s
critical that we help protect the successful collegiate sports model that has
provided students with educational and professional opportunities for more than

189
Kathryn Kisska-Schulze & Adam Epstein, Changing the Face of College Sports One Tax
Return at a Time, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 457, 460 (2021) (“While [NIL legislation] does not transform
student-athletes into employees of their institutions, income earned from the use of their NIL will
be subject to significant federal and state tax obligations.”).
190
In support of his proposed bill, Senator Burr tweeted: “If college athletes are going to make
money off their likenesses while in school, their scholarships should be treated like income. I’ll be
introducing legislation that subjects scholarships given to athletes who choose to “cash in” to
income taxes.” Richard Burr (@SenatorBurr), TWITTER (Oct. 29, 2019, 3:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/SenatorBurr/status/1189262863552208896.
191
NIL Scholarship Tax Act, S. 2897, 117th Cong. (2021).
192
Id. § 2. Student-athletes who receive less than $20,000 in NIL compensation would not be
required to pay taxes on their scholarship. Id.
193
Frank N. Darras, How NIL Will Impact Insurance, Taxes, and Other Legal Issues for
Collegiate
Athletes,
THE
RECORDER
(Dec.
21,
2021,
5:00
AM),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/2021/12/21/how-nil-will-impact-insurance-taxes-and-otherlegal-issues-for-collegiate-athletes/?slreturn=20220219222926.
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a century.”194 Proposals like Senator Burr’s fail to recognize that NIL income
does not affect amateurism or the college sports model—they provide
ultimatums rather than guidance.
Currently, student-athletes who receive money from sponsors are
considered independent contractors, meaning any applicable payroll taxes are not
withheld—the student-athlete must therefore be more cognizant of her NIL
income.195 This, however, will likely prove to be a difficult task. While keeping
track of cash income from NIL endorsements likely will not prove to be overly
difficult, today’s student-athletes also must keep track of the value of non-cash
items they receive, such as property, meals, and accommodations.196 To illustrate
this problem, “it would make no difference if a car dealership paid a studentathlete $5,000 for the use of his NIL or if the dealership loaned him a car with a
fair value of $5,000 for the period of time used; either way, the student-athlete
would have to report $5,000 as gross income.”197
Therefore, a better course of action than the NIL Scholarship Act is a
federal requirement that individual institutions provide a mandatory financial
literacy course to help student-athletes learn to be responsible with their earnings.
Many state NIL laws have enacted such provisions strictly for the benefit of the
student-athlete. For example, Georgia’s NIL law states that “A postsecondary
educational institution shall conduct a financial literacy and life skills workshop
for a minimum of five hours at the beginning of the student athlete’s first and
third academic years.”198 Georgia’s NIL law provides that the financial literacy
workshop is to include topics like financial aid, debt management, budgeting,
and time management skills.199 The class is intended to serve strictly as a
financial tool for student-athletes: Universities are expressly prohibited from
including anything related to marketing or advertising in the course
curriculum.200
The Georgia law’s requirements for an educational course on finances are
commendable and should be included in the federal law, in addition to guidance
on basic tax preparation.201 It is important to remember that student-athletes are

194
Brian Murphy, Tax College Athletes’ Scholarships if They Make Too Much Money, INDEP.
TRIB. (Sep. 29, 2021), https://independenttribune.com/news/state-and-regional/article_30c68b47af8a-58f9-951f-e40cbf71d2b1.html.
195
Nicole DeRosa, More NIL, More Taxes, WISS (Aug. 2, 2021), https://wiss.com/blog/morenil-more-taxes/ (illustrating that tax implications for independent contractors are typically more
complicated than tax implications for W-2 employees).
196
Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 189, at 481–82.
197
Id. at 482.
198
H.B. 617, 156th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021).
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Darras, supra note 193 (emphasizing that there is both a need and a desire for federal
guidance on all things NIL-related).
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young individuals, most of which are straight out of high school. Many studentathletes also cross state lines to attend the university of their choosing. Simply
put, earning NIL compensation means complicated tax obligations that if
improperly managed could have serious consequences.202
Essentially, a federal requirement that mandates universities to provide
their student-athletes with even basic guidance on their tax obligations would
help prevent innocent tax errors and potentially nefarious recruitment tactics.203
Furthermore, it would simply be irresponsible to make these dramatic NIL
changes but force student-athletes to navigate the complicated world of tax law
entirely on their own.
C. Individual States Must Follow Federal NIL Rules, but are Free to
Provide Broader Protections at the State Level
Although a federal NIL law should be very robust, requiring expansive
protections for student-athletes, it should also acknowledge that individual states
may be better suited to craft broader NIL protections that are more suited for
their student-athletes.204 Under such a framework, the federal and state
governments can function in harmony and advance the policy goal of the NIL
era: putting student-athletes first.205 Such institutional competence as balanced
between the federal and state governments also fosters judicial deference,206
which is a welcome change from the decades of cumbersome litigation
concerning NCAA governance and rulemaking.
For example, California’s NIL law, the Fair Pay to Play Act, is unique
in that it established a working group to consider extending NIL protections to
community college athletes.207 This could represent an effort to protect a unique
interest of California, such as a desire to encourage its students that community
college is a viable option to obtain a quality education. In so doing, promising

202

Kisska-Schulze & Epstein, supra note 189, at 457.
One commentator cautions against crooked recruiting and imagines a situation wherein
college coaches coax student-athletes: “Come to our school because we’ll help you build your
brand and you won’t have to pay any state income taxes on your earnings[.]” Andy Wittry, Talking
Taxes: How State Income Taxes, LLCs and Establishing Residency Could Affect NIL Income, OUT
OF BOUNDS WITH ANDY WITTRY (May 28, 2021), https://andywittry.substack.com/p/talking-taxeshow-state-and-local.
204
See Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.
J. 1, 8–9 (2006) (emphasizing that if either the federal or the state government fails in regulating
an issue, the other “remains available to come to the aid of the citizens”).
205
Id. at 8 (describing interactive federalism).
206
Id. (“The movement from dualist federalism to interactive federalism transfers the venue for
federalism debates. The agents of interactive federalism are legislators or administrators, not
judges. The role of the courts is to resist intervention.”).
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CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 67457 (West 2022).
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student-athletes can make the decision that is best for their unique situations
without being tempted by the prospect of earning NIL compensation.
Similarly, Maryland’s NIL law requires universities to adopt certain
safety guidelines. Named after a football player who tragically died from
heatstroke during a workout, the Jordan McNair Safe and Fair Play Act contains
many of the standard NIL provisions but also prioritizes the health and safety of
the state’s hard-working student-athletes.208
In summation, a robust federal NIL law should be a top priority. The law
should be carefully researched and crafted to afford student-athletes maximum
protection and to protect their best interests. However, this is not to say that
individual states should not have the ability to enact unique protections that may
be specially tailored to their state. So long as individual state NIL policies do not
run directly contrary to federal ones, the two should be permitted to coexist
harmoniously.

208

H.B. 125, 2021 Gen. Assemb., 442d Sess. (Md. 2021).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The effect that recent NIL legislation will have on the future of college
athletics cannot be overstated. Student-athletes, who were accustomed to saying
“no” to endorsement and sponsorship deals in the past, now have the potential to
cash in on their name, image and likeness. The NCAA, which has long avoided
antitrust law by clinging to the definition of amateurism and arguing that the
nature of collegiate sports exempts them from scrutiny, is now powerless against
the national NIL tide.
To be sure, NIL legislation is great news for student-athletes
everywhere. However, it is particularly beneficial for female student-athletes
who statistically have smaller chances of going professional or earning as much
money as their male counterparts in the post-college athletic landscape.
However, to properly ensure these benefits, a robust federal law is needed to
resolve the current patchwork of state legislation and NCAA interim policy. To
organize the chaos, a federal law that emphasizes that student-athletes deserve
all economic freedoms available to any other member of society, mandates that
universities hold financial literacy and tax workshops, and permits individual
states to create broader NIL protections that are beneficial to the unique
characteristics of their state is necessary. After decades of debate, litigation, and
controversy, it is finally time to put student-athletes first.
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